Duties

Paper packet. Every task here also exists on screen, where it is checked automatically; answers written on paper are not assessed by Nydus. When you are back at a device, enter your answers there.

1. What you will learn

You will identify a duty-based reason distinct from an outcome prediction, explaining the inference and its limits in a supplied case.

2. Starting point

A reason about what someone owes can differ from a forecast of benefits. Identify the undertaking, action, claimant, and conditions.

3. Terms to use precisely

4. A reason can concern what is owed

A duty-based argument asks what an agent is required to do or refrain from doing, and why that requirement applies. A borrower may owe the return of a book because they promised to return it, even when keeping it would be convenient. The reason refers to an undertaking and a relationship with the lender, not merely a prediction of the largest total benefit. Understanding this difference does not require believing that consequences never matter. It identifies one kind of moral reason that a supplied argument treats as independently significant.

Deontological ethics includes a range of views in which right action is not determined solely by maximizing consequences. Such views may recognize constraints, permissions, special responsibilities, or requirements connected to persons' status and agency. They differ over how strict particular duties are and how conflicts should be resolved. Do not infer from the category name that every deontologist endorses exactly the same list of absolute rules.

A duty is different from a desire, prediction, or custom. 'I want to return the book' reports an inclination. 'I will probably return it' predicts behavior. 'Borrowers here usually return books' reports a practice. 'I owe its return because I accepted that condition' offers a normative reason. The first three statements may be relevant background, but none is identical to the fourth. An ethical reconstruction should preserve the statement's role rather than classify every sentence mentioning a rule as a duty claim.

The exercises use explicitly supplied obligations and priorities. They assess whether you can reconstruct who owes what to whom, when the condition applies, and whether a conflict arises. They do not decide whether every real promise is binding in every circumstance, or ask you to reveal your own moral commitments. A bounded model makes the reasoning checkable while leaving the justification of its moral principles open to discussion.

Term	What it means
Duty	A requirement to act or refrain under the ethical account being considered.
Directed obligation	An obligation owed to an identifiable other party.
Permission	An action's being allowed, without necessarily being required.
Prima facie duty	A genuine moral reason that can be outweighed by another in a particular case.

Another way: Write the structure of an obligation

A directed obligation can be represented by an agent, an action, a recipient, and a condition or deadline. For example: Ada owes returning the borrowed atlas to Bao by Friday because she accepted a loan on those terms. The action is more precise than 'be helpful', the recipient identifies who has the corresponding claim, and the deadline fixes when performance is due. This structure helps distinguish an unmet obligation from a vague disappointment.

Some duties are general rather than owed only through a special relationship. A requirement not to deceive people may apply beyond a particular promise. Special obligations can arise from undertakings, roles, relationships, or past actions under the ethical account being considered. A person who damaged another's property might have a duty of reparation that a bystander does not have in the same way. An accurate argument explains the source rather than treating personal preference as sufficient to create or erase responsibility.

Scope matters. A promise to return one book does not automatically promise to reorganize the lender's whole collection. A confidentiality commitment about a particular draft does not necessarily cover every fact the parties know. Neither should a narrow reading be used dishonestly to evade what the undertaking clearly included. Reconstruct the supplied content fairly, paying attention to what was agreed, which conditions were stated, and what the parties could reasonably understand in the case.

Distinguish having an obligation from successfully performing it. Someone can owe an action even when they dislike it, and they can perform an action for a reason other than duty. A learner might return a book to avoid inconvenience rather than from respect for the promise. The act's conformity with the duty and the agent's motivation are different questions. Ethical theories can care about both, but a supplied argument should make clear which it is evaluating.

Another way: Requirements, permissions and prohibitions

A required action must be done under the stated account. A prohibited action must not be done. A permitted action is not ruled out, though it need not be obligatory. These categories prevent a common overstatement: showing that an action is allowed does not show that everyone must choose it. Similarly, failing to establish a duty to do something does not automatically establish a prohibition against it. The logical relations need to be stated rather than guessed from a favorable or unfavorable tone.

In a simple decision table, mark which options satisfy each supplied requirement. If a rule requires returning a tool before departure, an option that leaves the tool elsewhere fails that condition. If a second rule requires cleaning the bench, an option can satisfy the first while failing the second. An option satisfying all applicable requirements is compliant within the table. That label does not establish a complete moral verdict when the table intentionally includes only selected duties.

Do not replace duties with a count of convenient results. Suppose one option fulfils a promise and another produces more leisure for the borrower. Under a supplied promise-based criterion, extra leisure does not by itself erase the obligation. A consequentialist may argue that the promise matters because of trust or future effects; a duty-based argument may regard the undertaking as a reason even apart from that forecast. Compare the actual justificatory claim rather than assuming that the same recommended act must rest on the same theory.

Constraints can limit means as well as goals. An argument might allow helping a group while prohibiting achieving that help through a deceptive assurance to another person. The analysis should identify the action under constraint and the reason it is constrained. A good goal alone does not establish permission to use every means under that view. The rights lesson develops corresponding claims and limits in more detail.

Another way: Conflicting duties and moral remainder

Duties can appear to conflict when an agent cannot satisfy all applicable requirements. Two promises for the same time may be jointly impossible. A more serious responsibility may arise after a reasonable earlier undertaking. Before declaring a moral conflict, check the facts and scope: can the time be changed, can the task be delegated with permission, or was one condition never triggered? Some apparent conflicts disappear when the obligations are described accurately.

When the conflict remains, ethical accounts offer different approaches. Some duties are treated as strict constraints; other accounts allow priorities or defeasible duties. W. D. Ross's pluralist approach uses prima facie duties to describe genuine moral reasons that can be outweighed in a particular situation. In this use, prima facie does not mean a merely illusory duty that vanishes on inspection. It is a reason with moral force even when another reason determines what should be done overall.

Distinguish the duty that has decisive priority from the obligations that remain relevant. If an agent must break a minor appointment promise to respond to a more urgent responsibility under the supplied account, there may still be reasons to explain, apologize, or repair avoidable inconvenience. This moral remainder helps show why being overridden is different from never having mattered. The initial promise should not be erased from the story merely because it is not ultimately performed.

An explicit classroom priority rule can make a reconstruction determinate. The case may say that requirement A overrides B when they cannot both be met. Apply that rule without inventing a universal ranking for every possible duty. Then state the result conditionally: under this account and these facts, perform A and address the remaining effects of not performing B. A philosophical objection can subsequently challenge the priority rule or its application.

Do not equate conflict resolution with maximizing a numerical total unless the supplied theory does so. A rule prioritizing a particular obligation can depend on its source, stringency, or the protected claim, rather than the number of people who prefer each option. Conversely, acknowledging outcomes during deliberation does not automatically turn every pluralist duty account into simple aggregation. The structure of the justification matters more than whether consequences are mentioned at all.

Another way: How to reconstruct a duty argument

State the source of the requirement, the person bound, the required or prohibited action, the affected claimant if any, and the triggering conditions. Then compare the available options with that requirement. If an option fails it, name the failure precisely. If a conflict exists, identify the supplied priority principle instead of resolving it by personal preference or by counting how many duties have been listed.

Finally, distinguish the reconstruction from the evaluation. 'Under the promise principle, Ada owes return by Friday' states what follows from a norm and a fact. 'That principle is justified because voluntary undertakings create claims others may rely on' begins a defense of the norm. An objection might dispute the voluntariness, the scope of the promise, or the norm itself. Keeping these levels separate turns ethical disagreement into a specific question that evidence or argument can address.

5. Returning a borrowed exhibit model

A school club borrows a model from another group for an exhibition. Under the supplied classroom agreement, the club undertakes three duties: return the model by Friday, include every labeled component, and report any damage discovered during the loan. The club can either return it incomplete on time, return it complete a day late without seeking permission, or contact the lender and arrange a complete return on Friday through another volunteer.

The third option satisfies all three requirements if any discovered damage is also reported. The first meets the deadline but fails the completeness condition. The second meets completeness but fails the original deadline unless the lender agrees to a revision. The comparison is not settled by saying that each option satisfies 'a rule'. The duties have distinct contents, and the table must track each one separately.

Suppose the club discovers a small scratch. Hiding it would make the return easier and avoid an awkward conversation, but those predicted conveniences do not cancel the stated reporting duty under the supplied agreement. The relevant question is what the club undertook and what the lender is owed. A further discussion can examine why such commitments are ethically justified and whether any exceptional circumstances change them.

If an unavoidable transport failure makes Friday return impossible, the analysis should not pretend the original undertaking never existed. The club can communicate promptly, seek a revised arrangement, and address the inconvenience within its capacity. These actions illustrate the difference between resolving what to do now and erasing the moral significance of an unmet commitment. The classroom task reconstructs the obligations and available responses; it does not claim that every real borrowing dispute can be settled by a three-row table.

6. Check the tempting inference

A desire to keep a promise is not the promise-based duty itself, and a prediction of convenience is not its automatic cancellation. A permitted action need not be required. When duties conflict, state the supplied priority and preserve the significance of the overridden obligation rather than pretending it never mattered.

7. Who owes what?

8. Check all applicable requirements

9. A priority does not erase a remaining reason

10. Finish a borrowing-duty map

11. Guided practice

Supplied duties: D1 return by Friday; D2 include all parts; D3 disclose damage. Performance: return Friday, one part missing, damage disclosed. Reconstruct compliance.

12. Guided practice

D1 is the deadline; D2 is completeness; D3 is disclosure. Return is punctual and complete, but known damage is hidden. Complete the duty map.

13. Guided practice

Supplied duties: D1 meet the agreed date; D2 return the agreed item; D3 notify the lender of damage. Performance is late, the correct item is returned, and damage is reported. No deadline revision was agreed.

14. Practice

D1 requires timely return, D2 complete contents, D3 damage disclosure, D4 the agreed return location. All performance conditions are met except that known damage is hidden. Reconstruct the supplied duties.

15. Practice

A supplied agreement requires D1 timely return, D2 all parts, D3 defect disclosure and D4 correct recipient. A return is timely and reaches the correct recipient, but a part is missing and a known defect is concealed. Count met and unmet duties, then identify the disclosure duty by label.

16. Somewhere new

A school club's supplied agreement requires D1 Friday return, D2 all model pieces, D3 reporting a scratch, and D4 using the agreed handover point. The club returns on Friday with all pieces, reports the scratch, but leaves the model at another location without permission. Map the failure.

17. Lesson test

Lesson test: one question per skill, one attempt each, no hints. Your answers are checked when you submit.

18. Test question

A supplied agreement has D1 deadline, D2 complete parts, D3 disclosure, D4 recipient identity, and D5 packaging. The return meets D1, D2, D4 and D5, but a known defect is deliberately unreported. Count satisfied duties and name the unmet requirement.

19. What you can do now

Without rereading, explain how to identify a duty-based reason distinct from an outcome prediction. Give a fresh case and identify what would change your analysis.

	Your reconstruction
Met
Unmet
Disclosure

	Response
Met
Missed